The avalanche of books about John F. Kennedy timed to mark the 50th anniversary of his assassination in 1963 has begun. Among the first is historian and journalist Thurston Clarke’s JFK’s Last Hundred Days: The Transformation of a Man and the Emergence of a Great President (Penguin, 432 pp., $29.95), a friendly look Kennedy’s public and private lives from the first week of August of 1963 until his death on November 22.
The main issues JFK dealt with during that time period had to do with various aspects of the Cold War involving the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba; civil rights; and the Vietnam War. The central questions as far as Vietnam War policy was concerned centered on the 16,300 American advisors in the country. JFK basically had three options: Withdraw them, add more advisors, or escalate and bring in combat troops.
When he took office in January of 1961, fewer than 1,000 U.S. advisors were on the ground in Vietnam. Kennedy, a resolute Cold Warrior, pledged American support to the South Vietnamese in their fight against the communists and steadily increased the number of American Special Forces and other advisory units sixteen fold in his first two years in the White House.
Kennedy told NBC News anchors Chet Huntley and David Brinkley on September 9, 1963, that it “would not be helpful at this time” to reduce American aid to South Vietnam. He went on to say he believed in the Domino Theory, and said: “I think we should stay. We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw.”
On the other hand, at the same time—and throughout the final year of his life—JFK let his closest allies know that he was seriously considering removing significant numbers of American troops from Vietnam. He also expressed severe reservations about sending in combat troops.
Ever since his death, historians have debated the unanswerable question: What would JFK have done in Vietnam had he lived? Even though no one can definitely answer that what-if question, some Kennedy partisans have argued that JFK would have withdrawn the advisors and never would have escalated as his successor Lyndon Johnson did in 1964 and 1965.
Clarke firmly stands in that camp. His analysis of what JFK would have done cites the opinions only of those who came to believe that JFK would have withdrawn the advisory personnel and would not have escalated as Johnson did.
That list includes LBJ’s Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford (also a Kennedy confidant), Kennedy and LBJ Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, U.S. Sen. Wayne Morse of Oregon, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, former Texas Sen. John Connally, JFK and LBJ high-level national security man Walt Rostow, LBJ’s National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, JFK-friendly historian Arthur Schlesinger, America’s anchorman Walter Cronkite, and Robert F. Kennedy, JFK’s brother.
Even though all of these movers and shakers were close to one or both of the presidents their opinions are only that—opinions. Until and unless some undiscovered definitive Kennedy speech, letter, or conversation comes to light, the answer to the big question of what he would have done in Vietnam remains unanswered.