Into the Iron Triangle by Arrigo Velicogna

Arrigo Velicogna revisits an overlooked portion of the Vietnam War with Into the Iron Triangle: Operation Attleboro and the Battles North of Saigon, 1966 (Helion, 88 pp. $29.95, paper). Attleboro was the largest American operation of the war to that date.

Part of British publisher Helion’s Asia@War Series, this large-format book overflows with graphics. Classic color artwork of armored vehicles, aircraft, and troops on the ground enhance a wealth of black-and-white photographs. Maps appear when needed. The graphics could almost stand alone in telling the story of Operation Attleboro.

Velicogna holds a doctorate in war studies and has taught military history at King’s College London and Wolverhampton University. He also has worked for several British defense-related organizations.

After opening the book setting out the causes of the Vietnam War, Velicogna provides background on the forces that engaged in Attleboro. In his description of, as he puts, it, “the U.S. Army that fought the Vietnam War,” Velicogna covers the infantry battalions; mechanical, artillery, and aviation units; airpower; Mobile (Mike) Strike Forces; and gets into specifics examining the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, the 1st Infantry Division, and the 25th Infantry Division.

In this section—a book in itself—Velicogna amazed me with his ability to combine a multitude of minor points and form a complex picture in each category. He also has an unquestionable talent for research. His background material perfectly prepares the reader for the combat action that fills the second half of the book.

The time frame is November 1965-December 1966 when the South Vietnamese Army was incapable of assuming military security adequate to American expectations. MACV Commanding Gen. William Westmoreland therefore opted to forego counterinsurgency tactics until the U.S. decisively defeated enemy troops in hidden camps north of Saigon.

As a result, at Hill 65, Ap Bau Bang, Trung Loi, and Nha Mat, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division faced off against the Viet Cong’s 9th Division in encounters that preceded—and paved the way for—Operation Attleboro. That’s because the VC had planned to target ARVN forces, but the Americans got in the way. Velicogna crisply and concisely summarizes the fighting in which the U.S. troops prevailed.

The spontaneity of these battles and frequency of smaller ones caused the opposing Attleboro commanders—American Gen. Edward DeSaussure and VC Col. Hoang Cam—to modify their tactics erratically. What began as routine search-and-destroy missions rapidly expanded as Americans discovered many enemy base camps, ever-larger tonnages of rice, and large quantities of enemy supplies.

De Saussure eventually outmaneuvered himself, and Cam altered his tactics to meet the Americans head on. A stalemate ensued until the Big Red One’s commander, Gen. William DePuy, replaced DeSaussure and redeployed his scattered units. The fighting turned into a pursuit of Cam’s men to Cambodia. Velicogna describes these these events as if they happened yesterday.

196th Light Infantry Brigade troops north of their base camp at Tay Ninh during Operation Attleboro

He includes a box score of the 72-day-long Operation Attleboro in which friendly versus enemy losses in personnel and material are so disproportionate that they seem questionable. However, U.S. airpower and artillery swayed the outcome of many encounters, including more than 200 B-52 sorties against suspected command and logistics positions. To me, the greatest success of Attleboro was the discovery and destruction of 68 enemy base camps.       

Velicogna ranks Operation Attleboro as “the precursor of the later, larger, operations in [III Corps], especially Junction City.” The U.S. Army, he writes, “had found a way to grapple and maul enemy main force units in areas where unrestrained firepower could be brought to bear, in turn reducing their influence on pacification efforts.”

That conclusion sounds extremely self-evident. To wit: If, in some isolated spot, I can beat you mercilessly, I will win—and help others.

—Henry Zeybel

Storms Over the Mekong by William P. Head

William P. Head’s fascination with the Vietnam War stemmed from the number 176 he drew in the 1969 Selective Service lottery, which put him on the verge of being drafted into the U.S. Army. Many of his friends did serve, and some never came home, he says. Head had entered college in 1967, eventually earned a doctorate degree, and became a United States Air Force historian—as a civilian—and Chief of the Office of History at Robins AFB, Georgia. Over the past thirty-plus years, concentrating mainly on the Vietnam War, he has written and edited many books and articles about warfare.

Head’s latest book, Storms Over the Mekong: Major Battles of the Vietnam War (Texas A&M University, 480 pp. $40.00, hardcover; $24.99, Kindle), approaches the war by presenting and analyzing “the most significant and game-changing combat events” as he sees them. Head chose the events he says, based on the consensus of “the opinions of reputable participants, scholars, and analysts.”

The book begins in 1963 with the Viet Cong defeating the South Vietnamese Army at Ap Bac. It ends with the North Vietnamese Army capturing Saigon in 1975. The battles fit into two categories: “War on the Ground” and “War in the Air.” Head presents them chronologically, thereby pretty much telling the story of the entire war. He looks at ground encounters at Ia Drang Valley, Khe Sanh, Saigon and Hue during the 1968 Tet Offensive, Hamburger Hill, the 1972 Easter Offensive, and Xuan Loc. Interspersed air battles describe Rolling Thunder, Arc Light, Commando Hunt, and Linebackers I and II.

Some of the accounts previously appeared in other places, Head says, but he has revised them with “current data and historical information.” His studies of Rolling Thunder and the Easter Offensive are new work.

The book repeatedly claims that, despite America’s extravagant investment of manpower and money at the start of its military commitment, national unwillingness to fight a protracted war against a determined enemy was the fundamental reason for the conflict’s outcome.

Head recreates the self-defeating hesitancy of President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to apply air power over North Vietnam during Rolling Thunder in 1965-68. Head describes the operation as “Too Much Rolling and Not Enough Thunder.”

Johnson’s fear of greater Chinese or Soviet intervention in the war dictated his reticence throughout this time, Head says. Paralleling that feeling was Johnson’s contemptuous disregard for his generals’ opinions, which contradicted the respect shown to them in past wars. At the same time, Head faults the generals’ acceptance of unimaginative and ineffective strategies.      

The voices of political and military leaders from the U.S., South Vietnam, and North Vietnam are heard throughout the book. Background on North Vietnam’s planning and execution of Tet are particularly enlightening.

Head typically analyzes battles from high levels of command. Even the 1969 Battle of Hamburger Hill, in which American infantrymen paid an enormous toll, is overwhelmingly viewed from the battalion commanders’ level. In recalling the “senseless nature” of eleven attacks in ten days, Head quotes just two sentences from grunts.   

When editorializing, Head stays within reason, and his conclusions are to the point. For example, in the chapter about Hamburger Hill, he calmly names and indicts certain commanders for starting—but mostly for continuing—a battle in which significant casualties resulted and nothing was gained. He concludes that the defeat at Ap Bac was “a wake up call that the United States would have to take over the fight, the path American leaders chose twenty months later.” He summarizes the frustration bred by presidentially decreed air strategy as “what you get when airmen do not fully control air assets and run an air war.” 

His assessment of the battle of Ia Drang Valley concisely consolidates the opinions of American and North Vietnamese thinkers. McNamara’s perceptive interpretation of the battle’s outcome is a high point of the book.

Bill Head’s overall conclusion about the war chastises America for not learning the primary lesson from its involvement and thereby committing itself to duplicating similar protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He judges this as a betrayal of all those killed in the Vietnam War.

Storms Over the Mekong provides a package of facts supported by voluminous footnotes and an extensive bibliography. Well-placed maps and photographs enhance the discussions. The book should serve as a handy reference for old timers, as well as a textbook for students and others newly interested in the Vietnam War.

—Henry Zeybel

Operation Starlite by Otto Lehrack

In Operation Starlite: The Beginnings of the Blood Debt in Vietnam, August 1965 (Casemate, 233 pp. $19.95, paper), first published in hardcover in 2004, former Marine Otto Lehrack offers a tightly developed and very well researched and engaging telling of the story of the first major combat action of the Vietnam War.

In late August 1965, three battalions of U.S. Marines engaged with the 1st Viet Cong Regiment outside the newly created Marine base camp of Chu Lai in I Corps. This action included the first amphibious Marine landing since 1950 during the Korea War, and began the heavy use of helicopters, both offensive and defensive, in the coming escalation of the Vietnam War.

While this was the first important and successful battle of the war, it is often overlooked. About three months later the First Cav moved into the Ia Drang Valley and ran into a massive North Vietnamese Army force. The ensuing battle has been immortalized in Hal Moore and Joe Galloway’s We Were Soldiers Once and Young, and the movie based on it, as well as other books and magazine articles.

Lehrack’s extensive interviews with survivors from both sides of the battle provide him the context to fully flesh out the timeline and background of the engagement. His visits to the battlefields and camps after the war further expanded his ability to describe what took place. As he tells the story of the battle, Lehrack—who served two Vietnam War tours of duty—successfully integrates information about units, locations, battlefield developments, and the personal stories of the Marines involved, as well as the experiences of former Viet Cong .

During his conversations with the one-time VC fighters Lehrack learned about the lessons they learned from facing the American Marines’ method of engaging, attacking, fighting, and retrieving the wounded and fallen—as well as the employment of supporting arms and force multiplier weapons and tactics.

Otto Lehrack

In the introduction and epilogue, Lehrack speaks of the long history of aggression against the Vietnamese people. He notes the oft-disregarded idea that the Vietnamese simply sought their own sovereignty and relief from outside oppressors, including by the Americans

“It is one of the great tragedies of America, and of Vietnam War, that American policymakers were not more familiar with Vietnam’s history of dealing with foreign invaders,” Lehrack writes.

“America’s enemy, at least after 1965, consistently and successfully portrayed the war as the result of American Colonialism, and painted the South Vietnamese as American puppets.”

This is a good book, with a good battle history. Highly recommended.

–Tom Werzyn

Editor’s note: We briefly reviewed the book after it come out in hardcover in the March/April 2005 print edition of The VVA Veteran.

No Place to Hide by Bill Sly

On July 19, 1969, the North Vietnamese Army nearly destroyed Alpha 2/2 (Mech) of the U.S. Army’s First Infantry Division at Nui Ba Den mountain near Tay Ninh. American generals made bad decisions based on false assumptions resulting from faulty intelligence that led to the disaster.

Bill Sly discusses these events in great detail in No Place to Hide: A Company at Nui Ba Den (iUniverse, 182 pp. $13.99, paper; $3.99, Kindle). Sly served as the 2/2 historian after time in the field as an infantryman. He bases most of his reporting on interviews with survivors of the attack on the mountain.

Nui Ba Den (Black Virgin Mountain) rose to nearly a thousand meters and spanned a mile in width. The United States Army controlled the top and the perimeter around the mountain’s base, but the Eighty-Eighth NVA Regiment controlled everything in between. Plans called for 2/2 to scale the mountain, much in the manner of the taking of Hamburger Hill, while another American unit attacked from the top.

From there, planning disintegrated. Under temporary command of the 25th Infantry Division, the men of Alpha 2/2 were ordered to dismount from their vehicles and advance on foot, a decision that violated unit-level training. Furthermore, dismounting contradicted Vietnam War armored warfare tactics, which Sly explains. According to survivors, a 25th general said, “I want a body count,” and sent 2/2 up the mountain—without support from the unit on top.

The men walked into a trap. Finding themselves in open terrain and under highly concentrated fire from an enemy that held the high ground, the men of 2/2 made great sacrifices for each other as they split into smaller and smaller groups. They fought all day to extricate themselves from the area. The following day survivors with help from Charlie Company again went forward to recover bodies.

In the two-day encounter, Alpha had nine men killed in action and forty-four wounded. Charlie had two KIA and four WIA.

The Stars and Stripes portrayed the battle as a great American victory, which upset the participants. And then, Sly says, the battle appears to have been forgotten. (I searched internet but found no reference to it.) No Place to Hide is Sly’s contribution to setting the record straight.

The book also provides one more reminder of American Vietnam War folly for taking or securing terrain, regardless of the cost, only to eventually abandon it.

Sly writes from the heart. With a calm certitude, he validates the valor and fellowship of the men of Alpha 2/2. He neither editorializes nor pontificates in recreating two days of drama. Although he was on the scene in 1969, many of his endnotes refer to telephone conversations and letters dating from 1995. His research and the conclusions that he offers present valuable combat lessons.

—Henry Zeybel

MiG-17/19 Aces of the Vietnam War by Istvan Toperczer

 

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Long ago, I picked the minds of a few USAF fighter jocks and used their expertise to write The First Ace, a novel about a man who sought that title in the Vietnam War. In the book—spoiler alert!—he didn’t succeed. But in real life, five American flyers did attain ace status. My biggest failure in writing the novel was overlooking pilots who flew for the North Vietnamese People’s Air Force who also had the goal of ace status in mind.

With MiG-17/19 Aces of the Vietnam War (Osprey, 96 pp; $23, paper; $9.99, Kindle), Dr. István Toperczer, a Hungarian Air Force flight surgeon in the Hungarian Air Force, describes part of the air war over North Vietnam that I never imagined. Toperczer has written four other books about VPAF operations, including Air War Over North Viet Nam: The Vietnamese People’s Air Force 1949-1977. During the past twenty years, he has traveled to Vietnam to research files and interview VPAF pilots. Relationships that began when Hungarian and VPAF pilots trained together in the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s helped Toperczer to gain access to newly released North Vietnamese archive files.

The air war over the North took place from April 1965 to November 1968 when America ended Operation Rolling Thunder. It resumed in 1972-73 with Operation Linebacker. During the lull, MiG-17s flew intercept missions against American AQM-34 Firebee reconnaissance drones.

MiG-17/19 Aces of the Vietnam War highlights seven men who achieved ace status as MiG-17 pilots, one of whom also flew the MiG-21. The book devotes a lone chapter to the pilots of the supersonic, but short-lived, MiG-19 Farmer.

The story line follows air battles—often on a day-to-day basis—across North Vietnam as reported by VPAF pilots. Toperczer presents the high and low points of the air war without taking sides and provides interesting explanations of the MiGs’ ever-evolving tactics to outwit USAF and USN attackers.

For example, MiG pilots initially had to be taught that it was more important to hit bombers, rather than take part in dogfights with escort aircraft. Self-survival instinct taught MiG pilots to develop and refine maneuvers to dodge air-to-air missiles. Toperczer recreates the spring of 1967 when the Vietnamese lost ten of their best pilots in seven aerial battles and had few aircraft to fly during the summer after many had been damaged on the ground.

Toperczer cites additional disadvantages under which the enemy operated. To begin, North Vietnam started from scratch in 1956 when the first pilot candidates entered training in China and the Soviet Union. Candidates were small in stature with limited technical knowledge and skills. To finally take shape in 1959, VPAF principally relied on a Soviet gift of MiG-17s. During the war, American aircraft far outnumbered the enemy’s fleet.

On the ground, VPAF aircraft found their safest sanctuaries in mountain caves distant from airfields, to where Mi-6 “Hook” helicopters airlifted them. In battle, MiG pilots had limited autonomy and often broke off attacks at the command of ground controllers. The MiG-17 lacked air-to-air missiles, and its pilots depended entirely on cannon fire, preferring to dogfight at low altitudes in the horizontal plane because the aircraft’s major advantage was unequaled low-speed maneuverability.

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Dr. Estvan Toperczer

Aerial victories discussed by Toperczer are debatable. His summary of accomplishments of MiG-17 aces shows that many kills listed in VPAF records are contradicted by United States records that call them “loss attributed to anti-aircraft artillery.” Similarly, a high percentage of MiG-17 kill claims are “not confirmed by U.S. records.” Statements such as “U.S. records show no loss as a result of aerial combat on that day” conclude several accounts. In a reversal of misfortune, Toperczer points out that some USAF and USN kill claims are not substantiated by North Vietnamese records.

Along with ten pages of color plates of MiG-17/19 aircraft and several color maps, black and white photographs of crewmen and aircraft appear on almost every page. I would have appreciated, however, a page of data that summarized MiG-17 /19 specifications and performance.

Otherwise, Toperczer taught me that my novel lacked dimension by failing to spell out that North Vietnam’s pilots fought with the same degree of intensity and bravery as American Air Force and Navy jocks did.

—Henry Zeybel

Vietnam’s High Ground by J.P. Harris

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Clarifying the fine points of exactly how the United States became involved in the Vietnam War might keep historians busy forever. Of course, the Domino Theory offers an obvious answer—one nation falls to communism and that pushes over others. But that choice resembles a conclusion such as “Joe committed suicide after growing tired of living” without examining Joe’s broken marriages, job losses, PTSD, and Agent Orange symptoms.

In other words, examining underlying details reveals reasons for the war that are far more interesting.

In 2015, Charles R. Shrader published A War of Logistics: Parachutes and Porters in Indochina, 1945-1954 in which he described the First Indochina War—fought by the French in the Red River area of North Vietnam, then called Tonkin—as a “war in which logistics decided the outcome.” Research proved his conclusion in the sense that poor logistical support can (and, in this case, did) defeat an army. Schrader based his argument on what he found in declassified contemporary French official documents and U.S. intelligence material, as well as “reports and memoirs of French participants and Western observers,” plus a wide range of secondary studies.

In Vietnam’s High Ground: Armed Struggle for the Central Highlands, 1954-1965 (University Press of Kansas, 552 pp. $45, hardcover; $27.99, Kindle), J.P. Harris provides a fitting continuation to Shrader’s history. Harris—a senior lecturer in war studies at the Sandhurst Royal Military Academy in England—moves the action southward and makes large-scale use of Vietnamese communist sources and American archives. His research examines the evolution of military action in Vietnam’s Central Highlands from subversion, insurgency, and counterinsurgency through the major battles of 1965.

Despite the dates in its subtitle, Vietnam’s High Ground focuses on military action in the 1960s with the last half of the book devoted to 1965. Concluding his accounts of fighting that was costly to both sides in the Ia Drang Valley, Harris says, “It would have taken a reckless pundit to pick a winner at this stage.”

Harris’ book is formidable. Opening it to any page provides a wealth of facts and explanations on major and minor events of the time and area. All of it offers perspectives of actions from all participants. Excellent maps, photographs, and forty-five pages of notes perfectly complement the text.
Reading the book made me feel humble. Harris covers all that I was familiar with about the early fighting in the Highlands. Well beyond that, though, he delves into actions that were unknown to me. His depth of investigation presents a stand-alone education about that phase of warfare in Vietnam.

Vietnam’s High Ground adds valuable insight to The University Press of Kansas’s Modern War Studies Series.

—Henry Zeybel

Vietnam 1967-68 by David R. Higgins

Vietnam 1967-68: U.S. Marine Versus NVA Soldier (Osprey, 80 pp., $18.95, paper; $15,.95 e book) is an excellent book for readers unfamiliar with the Vietnam War. In it, author David R. Higgins, a veteran military historian, compares U.S. Marines and the NVA soldiers by dissecting three of their encounters in I Corps: the Hill Fights in April 1967, Operation Kingfisher in July 1967, and the Battle for Hue during the 1968 Tet Offensive.

The book provides background on the political origins of the war and on soldier-level topics such as training, logistics, leadership, morale, weapons, and tactics. Countless books have covered the latter material, particularly from the American viewpoint. Higgins stands out by discussing the Marines and the NVA separately and objectively emphasizing dissimilarities.

Fighting in the three engagements was ferocious and produced large numbers of casualties on both sides. Higgins’ accounts include information from both sides. Months prior to Tet, the NVA initiated a master plan that gave them superior positioning at the start of the offensive; American leaders failed to recognized the plan.

Higgins concludes that poor intelligence gathering also hindered the Marines in the Hill Fights and Kingfisher. At Hue, the confinement of city streets caused the Marines to operate independent of air and artillery support and reduced the effectiveness of armor. At the same time, he says, the ability to operate with less material and support than other U.S. forces gave the Marines greater flexibility to adapt to changing battle conditions.

              U.S. Marines during the fighting in Hue city, Tet 1968

Higgins identifies the use of irregular tactics, avoiding confrontation until establishing a superior position, and functioning with minimal supplies as factors that increased NVA combat success. Generally superior in numbers, NVA forces frequently ambushed the Marines. Furthermore, Higgins says, NVA soldiers had high levels of morale and motivation, which maximized their ability to learn and apply combat lessons.

This magazine-sized book contains excellent photographs and maps. Illustrator Johnny Shumate’s drawings of soldiers and combat scenes are extremely lifelike.

—Henry Zeybel

Last Stand at Khe Sanh by Gregg Jones

Gregg Jones’s 2014 book, Last Stand at Khe Sanh: The U.S. Marines’ Finest Hour in Vietnam, is now available in paperback (Da Capo, 358 pp., $16.99). Veteran journalist and author Jones, best known for his book on the Philippine War, Honor in the Dust, concentrates here on telling the personal stories of the American Marines in the trenches in the pivotal Vietnam War battle at Khe Sanh in 1968.

As we noted in our review in Books in Review column in the July/August print issue, “this informing book serves as a testament to the Khe Sanh Marines who, as Jones puts it, ‘heeded the call of their duly constituted leaders’ and ‘went to Vietnam with the best of intentions,’ earning ‘a place of honor in American history.’”

—Marc Leepson

Gray Horse Troop by Charles Baker

Gray Horse Troop: Forever Soldiers (Powder River Publications, 360 pp., $15.59, paper) pays tribute to the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry’s actions in the Vietnam War during the first six months of 1968. At that time, the book’s author, Charles Baker, served as the 5/7 Operations Officer. Before telling what took place during that time, Baker briefly backfills the 5/7’s history, including its Indian-fighting days.

Baker, a West Point graduate, transferred to the 5/7 as a new Major. However, having just served six months with 3/1 while a Captain, Baker had combat experience. A few days after he arrived, the 5/7 moved to Quang Tri in time for the start of the Tet Offensive.

In great detail, Baker chronicles the fighting of 5/7 north of Hue during Tet ’68. His day-by-day accounts spell out the wins and losses of his unit’s effort to regain control of villages captured by the North Vietnamese Army. Following that task, the 5/7 helped defeat the North Vietnamese controlling Hue.

Baker then employs the same meticulous approach in reporting his unit’s involvement in Operation Pegasus—the massive heliborne assault in support of Khe Sanh—and a far-more-costly assault into the A Shau Valley. Many maps, along with a few photographs, support his well-written and straight-to-the-point narrative.

Charles Baker – photo by Will Dickey, The Times–Union

Charlie Baker’s unfiltered command insight might open the eyes of former enlisted men who still wonder how decisions that affected them were made. Baker is a dedicated soldier’s soldier who constantly considered his men’s welfare. Occasionally, he leaps from past to present, and between Vietnam and Iraq, a trait that should present no problem for anyone who understood Inception or The Matrix.

Best of all, Baker logically finds fault where fault is due. And he generously praises those who did the right thing.

About halfway through the book, retired Col. Baker takes an eight-chapter detour to describe his 2005 trip to Iraq as a reporter/columnist embedded with the 5/7. At this point, his tone changes: He sounds like a crusty old man in search of answers that nobody can provide.

Of course, much of what he sees is discouraging enough to unhinge a saint. In the midst of it, he writes: “It was not easy finding similarities between Iraq and Vietnam.” The way I read it, one might argue that the similarities are there, but they are too depressing to confront. Baker’s frustration sometimes lapses into humor, intentional or not.

At the end of the book, Baker solidifies 5/7’s place in history by including citations for three Medals of Honor and five Distinguished Services Crosses awarded to its members during the first half of 1968. He also lists 325 names of the unit’s Purple Heart recipients for that period.

Most significantly, ahead of all others, he honors the 5/7 soldiers killed in action: 101 from October 1967 to June 1968, and 17 from 2005 to 2013.

—Henry Zeybel

Charlie Chasers by Larry Elton Fletcher

Larry Elton Fletcher joined the U.S. Air Force in June of 1968 after having graduated from Missouri State University with a B.S. in Education in 1965, receiving his M.E. from the University of Missouri in 1966, and teaching high school for two years. He was a newly minted second lieutenant by September, and received his pilot’s wings in November of 1969.

Fletcher (above) arrived in Vietnam in May of 1970 and served with the 17th Special Operations Squadron at Tan Son Nhut AB, Saigon. Among other things, he flew 177 combat missions over Cambodia co-piloting and later piloting AC-119 “Shadow” gunships.

Fletcher relates the history of the those fixed-wing, twin-engine, side-firing gunships in the Vietnam War in Charlie Chasers: History of USAF AC-119 ‘Shadow’ Gunships in the Vietnam War (Hellgate Press, 328 pp., $34.95, hardcover; $24.95, paper).

The book is filled with plenty of technical details about the planes—which provided close fire support for troops on the ground—and those who flew them. It also includes extended first-person accounts from Fletcher’s fellow pilots, navigators, and other AC-119 personnel.

The author’s website is www.shadowgunships.com

—Marc Leepson