United States Marine Reconnaissance in the Vietnam War” Ghost Soldiers and Sea Commandos, 1963-1971 (McFarland, 352 pp. $39.95, hardcover; $25.99, paper) is a deeply researched and very readable history of the highly trained U.S. Marine Recon units during virtually the entire Vietnam War. The author, Leo J. Daugherty III, is the Senior Command Historian for the U.S. Army Cadet Command at Fort Knox, Kentucky.
Daugherty begins by reviewing the history of American military reconnaissance from 1898 until the Vietnam War, highlighting the evolution of tactics, strategy, equipment, personnel, and missions. There are excellent photos, diagrams, endnotes, a glossary, a bibliography that includes 24 memoirs, an index and many first-hand accounts from Marine Corps veterans.
The bulk of the book chronicles the experiences of Marine recon units during the Vietnam War and includes some exciting and dramatic battle descriptions. Throughout the book, there is a continuing tension about whether those units should have been be limited to being just “the eyes and ears of the I Corps commandos,” or fighters, as well.
Four-man units were used solely for intelligence gathering, while eight-man units included a raiding and ambush function. All included a Navy corpsman. The recon units were analogous to Army LRRP’s, but had water-insertion capabilities and training and sometimes harbor-intelligence responsibilities.
While praising the effectiveness of these units for their intelligence gathering and for their fighting acumen, Daugherty is critical of many commanders’ disbelief of the units’ intelligence reports and of their reluctance to pass down that critical information to battalion commanders.
As a prime example, he believes that substantial information about the enemy’s buildup before the 1968 Tet Offensive was obtained by the recon units, as well as by other intelligence sources, but was disregarded by commanders as unreliable. That disregard was one reason that U.S. and South Vietnamese forces were unprepared for the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive.
Moreover, human nature came to fore. Professional and personal jealousies caused many of the recon Marines to be reassigned to other units–mainly because some of the brass did not want “an elite within an elite.”
The book contains some interesting facts, including that the to avoid being detected, the Recon Marines made sure they had no bowel movements during their six days out in the field. They felt they could smell the enemy, so why not the reverse? One operation was in the “Leech Valley” near Da Nang, as if one place in South Vietnam location could have more leeches than every other one. It must have been a particularly horrible place.
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The enemy called the recon units “ghost soldiers” because of their ability to be undetected when out on operations. They even placed a bounty on their heads.
Air-patrolling I Corps to gain intelligence was relatively ineffective because of bad weather, difficult terrain, and vegetation (mainly triple-canopy jungle). One wonders how modern technology, particularly drones and satellite imagery might have changed the boots-on-the- ground need for these units in Vietnam and how that technology will be will be used in wars today and in the future.
As we learned after the Vietnam War, you shouldn’t fight a war with the tactics, strategy, and equipment of a prior war.
–Harvey Weiner
Books in Review II 